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1 Introduction
In this paper we deal with the problem of allocating a fixed amount of indivisible
units of an homogeneous good among a group of agents whose preferences are sin-
gle-peaked. The standard example is that of a group of agents who collectively must
supply a certain quantity of labor paid at a fixed rate, in order to complete a task that is
a common responsibility, and time comes in indivisible units. Take, for instance, the
case of a health center in which there are a certain number of shifts to be covered by
doctors, an airline company that has to assign flights to crew members, or a University
Department in which some teaching hours should be covered by faculty members.
If the agents’ (doctors, crew members, professors) disutility of labor is concave, their
induced preferences are single-peaked, namely, each individual has an ideal number
of units of time to work, and having to work more or less decreases her utility.
The above situation is a particular instance of a general set of problems called
allocation problems with indivisibilities when preferences are single-peaked. These
problems are described by three elements. First, a set of agents (doctors, crew mem-
bers, university professors). Second, an amount of indivisible units of time to distrib-
ute, called task (number of shifts, flights, or teaching hours). And third, a profile of
single-peaked preferences over the number of units of time to work. When the aggre-
gate supply of labor (i.e. the sum of the ideal amounts) differ from the units of time
required to complete the task, some procedure should be designed in order to allocate
the difference. A rule or solution is a mechanism to distribute the task among the
agents according to their preferences.
In the axiomatic method, solutions are justified in terms of the properties they
fulfil, and, in general, suitable combinations of desirable properties are used to differ-
entiate among rules. In this paper, we focus on five axioms: efficiency, balancedness
(equal agents receive “almost” equal amounts, i.e., they differ at most in one unit),
strategy-proofness (it is not in the interest of the agents to misrepresent their pref-
erences), and consistency (stability with respect changes in the set of agents). Bal-
ancedness has some “fairness” flavor, whereas strategy-proofness and consistency are
“procedural properties”.
In this paper we identify the class of rules that, applied to the allotment of indivisi-
ble units, are efficient, balanced, strategy-proof, and consistent. Interestingly, any rule
in this family can be obtained by a very simple allocation method. In these methods,
we start by (temporarily) assigning to each agent her ideal amount of units of time to
work, and then, moving away from this temporary assignment on a unit-by-unit basis
until achieving the task. We refer to such a family of rules as Temporary Satisfaction
methods (TS methods, in short). After (provisionally) assigning each agent her ideal
amount, the different rules vary in the way they move away up to reaching the task. We
do so by considering types of priority orders, which we call priority standards. They
are simply priority orders on agent-number pairs that favor larger numbers. Here, the
numbers paired with the agents are interpreted either as agents’ peaks or the opposite
peaks, depending upon the type of problem in hand (either an excess supply or excess
demand problem, respectively).
By far the best-known rule in the continuous case, when the task is perfectly divis-
ible, is the uniform rule, introduced in Benassy (1982), and first characterized in
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Sprumont (1991). It proposes to treat all agents as equally as possible, subject to effi-
ciency. Characterizations of this rule also appear in Ching (1994), Sönmez (1994),
Thomson (1994a,b), and Dagan (1996), among others. The uniform rule is efficient,
equitable, and non-manipulable. It is worth noting that TS methods can be interpreted
as discrete versions of the uniform rule. This statement is supported by two facts.
First, the family of TS methods can be characterized by combinations of properties
similar to those supporting the uniform rule. And second, for any problem, the allo-
cation prescribed by the uniform rule is the ex-ante expectation of the agents under
the application of TS methods, if all plausible priority standards are equally likely.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Sect. 2 we set up the model.
In Sect. 3 we analyze the properties our families of rules may fulfil. In Sect. 4 we
introduce priority standards, use them to construct TS methods and also present our
characterization result. In Sect. 5 we establish the connections between the TS meth-
ods and the uniform rule. Finally, in Sect. 6 we conclude with some final remarks.
Examples providing the tightness of the characterization are relegated to Appendix A,
while proofs are in Appendix B.
2 Statement of the model
A preference relation, R, defined over Z+ is single-peaked if there exists an integer
number p(R) ∈ Z+ (called the peak of R) such that, for each a, b ∈ Z+,
a Pb ⇔ [(b < a < p(R)) or (p(R) < a < b)] ,
where P is the strict preference relation induced by R. Let S denote the class of all
single-peaked preferences defined over Z+. Let N be the set of all potential agents and
N be the family of all finite non-empty subsets of N.
An allocation problem with single-peaked preferences, or simply a problem, is
a triple e = (N, T, R) in which a fixed number of units T (called task) has to be
distributed among a group of agents, N ∈ N , whose preferences over consumption
are single-peaked, R = (Ri )i∈N ∈ SN . Let A denote the class of problems.
For each problem, we face the question of finding a division of the task among the
agents. An allocation for e ∈ A is a list of integers, x ∈ ZN+ , satisfying the condition
of being a complete distribution of the task, i.e.,
∑
i∈N xi = T . Let X(e) be the set
of all allocations for e ∈ A. A rule is a function, F : A −→ ⋃e∈A X (e), that selects,
for each problem e ∈ A, a single allocation F(e) ∈ X (e).
3 Properties
Our goal in this paper is to obtain efficient, strategy-proof, consistent, and balanced
rules to solve allocation problems with indivisibilities when preferences are single-
peaked.
A basic requirement a rule must satisfy is efficiency. An allocation is efficient if
there is no other allocation in which all the agents are better-off. Efficiency requires
that the rule selects efficient allocations.
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Efficiency. For each e ∈ A, there is no allocation x ∈ X (e) such that, for each
i ∈ N , xi Ri Fi (e), and for some j ∈ N , x j Pj Fj (e).
As Sprumont (1991) points out, the principle of efficiency is equivalent to asking
each agent to provide no more than her peak when the aggregate supply exceeds the
task, and no less than her peak otherwise. That is, if F is efficient, Fi (e) ≤ p(Ri )
for each i ∈ N if ∑i∈N p(Ri ) ≥ T , and Fi (e) ≥ p(Ri ) for each i ∈ N if∑
i∈N p(Ri ) ≤ T .
Normally, agents report their preferences directly to a central planner. This opens the
door to the possibility of manipulation from those agents. Strategy-proofness requires
that it is not in the benefit of any agent to misrepresent her preference.1
Strategy-proofness: For each e = (N , T, (Ri , R−i )) ∈ A and each e′ = (N , T,
(R′i , R−i )) ∈ A, Fi (e)Ri Fi (e′).
Now, we deal with a sort of robustness condition with respect to changes in pop-
ulation. Suppose that, after solving the problem e = (N , T, R) ∈ A, a proper subset
of agents, S ⊂ N , decides to reallocate their total share of the task, that is, they face a
new allocation problem: (S,
∑
i∈S xi , RS), where RS = (Ri )i∈S and x is the allocation
corresponding to apply the rule to the problem e. Consistency requires that each agent
i ∈ S receives the same amount of units in problem (S,∑i∈S xi , RS) as she did in
problem e. In other words, the new reallocation is only a restriction to the subset S of
the initial one.2








There are different traditional fairness properties: one is to treat identical agents
identically. Together with efficiency, it simply means that agents with identical pref-
erences should receive the same amount. This requirement cannot be unconditionally
met in the indivisibilities case. We relax this property by simply asking identical agents
to be “almost” indifferent among their allotted shares of the task. More precisely, equal
agents get amounts that can differ only in one unit, which represents the size of the
indivisibility.3
Balancedness. For each e ∈ A and each {i, j} ⊆ N , if Ri = R j then |Fi (e) −
Fj (e)| ≤ 1
Notice that balancedness does not require to treat identical agents identically, even
when this is possible. Consider, for instance, the problem e ∈ A where N = {1, 2, 3},
T = 5, and R is such that R1 = R2 and p(R) = (3, 3, 2). A balanced rule may
select the allocation F(e) = (1, 2, 2). However, in this problem it is possible to
treat equally agents 1 and 2 by choosing the allocation (2, 2, 1). Why then not to
impose an axiom that requires to treat identical agents identically when it is pos-
sible? Essentially because it is incompatible with strategy-proofness. Indeed, let us
1 The notation R−i refers to the preference profile R where agent i has been deleted, i.e., R−i = RN{i}.
2 The concept of consistency in the divisible case is introduced in Thomson (1994b). See also Thomson
(1998b) for a widely exposition of consistency and its converse.
3 Young (1994) and Herrero and Martínez (2008) formulate a similar property in the claims problems
context.
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consider a profile R ∈ SN such that p(Ri ) = 2 for all i ∈ N . Without loss of gener-
ality we can assume that F(N , 1, R) = (1, 0, . . . , 0). Now, if one agent i ∈ N − 1
changes her preference to R′i such that p(R′i ) = 4, in application of equal treatment
when possible, it must happen that Fj (N , 1, (R1, R′i , R−1i )) = 0 for all j 
= i and
Fi (N , 1, (R1, R′i , R−1i )) = 1 > 0 = Fi (N , 1, (R1, Ri , R−1i )), which contradicts
strategy-proofness.
4 A family of rules. Temporary satisfaction methods
Now we face the question of finding rules satisfying the properties formulated in
Sect. 3. To do so, we shall consider a two-step procedure.
A priority standard is a linear order over the cartesian product N × Z (potential
agent/number), such that pairs involving larger numbers go first.4
Priority standard, σ . It is a linear ordering on the set of all pairs (i, a) ∈ N × Z
such that, for all i, j ∈ N and all a ∈ Z, (i, a + 1)σ ( j, a). Let  denote the class of
all priority standards.
Let {(i, ai )}i∈L be a collection of pairs agent-number. Let σ be a priority standard.
The pair with the highest priority in {(i, ai )}i∈L according to σ is the pair (i, ai )
such that (i, ai )σ ( j, a j ) for all j ∈ L  {i}.
Priority standards will be used to accommodate all units of either excess demand or
excess supply on a unit-by-unit basis, after giving (temporarily) all agents their peaks.
For any given problem e, and for each agent in e, we consider all pairs involving that
agent together with any number smaller or equal than her peak (whenever we are in an
excess-supply problem), or the opposite of her peak otherwise. The priority standard
orders all those pairs. Then, we start by allocating each agent her peak. Now, we move
away from the peaks on a unit by unit basis, according to the priority standard up to
achieving the task. Different priority standards give rise to different ways of solving
problems, i.e., different rules. We call those rules Temporary Satisfaction methods (in
short, TS methods).
Temporary satisfaction method associated to σ , T Sσ : Let e ∈ A. Start by giving
each agent her peak. Now we distinguish two cases.
1. If we face an excess-supply problem, i.e.,
∑
i∈N p(Ri ) ≥ T . In this case we have
to remove some units from the temporary allocation. Take the collection of all pairs
{(i, ai )}i∈N with ai ≤ p(Ri ). Those pairs are ranked according to σ . Identify the
pair with the highest priority, subtract one unit from the temporary assignment of
this agent, and remove the pair from the collection. Identify the pair with the next
highest priority according to σ , and proceed in the same way until achieving the
task.
2. If we face an excess-demand problem, i.e.,
∑
i∈N p(Ri ) ≤ T . In this case we
have to allocate some extra units, T ′ = T − ∑i∈N p(Ri ). We shall proceed in
the following way. Take the collection of all pairs {(i, ai )}i∈N with ai ≤ −p(Ri ).
Those pairs are ranked according to σ . Identify the pair with the highest priority,
give one unit of the remaining task T ′ to this agent, and remove the pair from
4 Related notions appear in Young (1994) and Herrero and Martínez (2008).
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the collection. Identify the pair with the next highest priority according to σ , and
proceed in the same way until T ′ runs out.
The next example illustrates how temporary satisfaction methods work.
Example 4.1 Let N = {1, 2, 3}, and let σ be a priority standard such that
(1, x)σ (2, x)σ (3, x) if x is odd, and (1, x)σ (3, x)σ (2, x) if x is even. Now, consider
the allocation problem where N = {1, 2, 3}, T = 6, and R = (R1, R2, R3) such that
R2 = R3 and p(R) = (1, 5, 5). We start by temporarily fully satisfying all the agents.
This means giving 11 units while we only have 6, that is, we need to subtract 5. To
do that, we then take all the pairs {(1, 1), (1, 0), (1,−1), (1,−2), . . . , (2, 5), (2, 4),
(2, 3), . . . , (3, 5), (3, 4), (3, 3), . . .}. According to σ , the pair with the highest prior-
ity is (2, 5). Then we subtract one unit from agent 2. The pair with the next highest
priority is (3, 5). Then we subtract the second unit from agent 3, and so on. Applying
the aforementioned procedure, we obtain the result that T Sσ (e) = (1, 2, 3). The table
below presents the procedure.
highest priority pair (2, 5) (3, 5) (3, 4) (2, 4) (2, 3)
assignment (1, 5, 5) (1, 4, 5) (1, 4, 4) (1, 4, 3) (1, 3, 3) (1, 2, 3)
If the number of units to allot is T = 14, then T Sσ (e) = (4, 5, 5). The table below
details the functioning of the procedure.
highest priority pair (1,−1) (1,−2) (1,−3)
assignment (1, 5, 5) (2, 5, 5) (3, 5, 5) (4, 5, 5)
As mentioned above, our goal is to identify efficient, balanced, strategy-proof, and
consistent rules. In our main result, we obtain that there is a family of rules compatible
with these four requirements, the family of TS methods. The proof, preceded by some
lemmas, is relegated to Appendix B.
Theorem 4.1 A rule F satisfies efficiency, balancedness, strategy-proofness, and
consistency if and only if there exists a priority standard σ ∈  such that F = T Sσ .
Moulin (1999) identifies the family of rules that are efficient, resource monotonic
(an increase in the task does not result in the decrease of some agent’s assignment),
strategy-proof, and efficient. Those solutions are the so called fixed path rules. In the
previous theorem we substitute resource monotonicity by balancedness, and we end
up with the temporary satisfaction methods. Our TS methods also satisfy resource
monotonicity, and therefore are particular cases of the fixed path rules when, using the
terminology in Moulin (1999), the priority steps do not draw away from equitability
by more than one unit.
5 Relations between the discrete and the continuum
In the previous section we obtained a characterization for the family of TS methods.
The properties used in such a result (Theorem 4.1) are very much related to those used
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by Ching (1994) to characterize the uniform rule.5 This fact suggests the existence
of a close relationship between our TS methods and the uniform rule. Actually, TS
methods can be interpreted as discrete versions of the uniform rule in the following
sense. The allocation prescribed by the uniform rule is the ex-ante expectation of the
agents under the application of TS methods, if all priority standards are equally likely.
Proposition 5.1 Let e ∈ A. Let e denote the subset of  of the different priority





T Sσ (e) = u(e)
An additional point of similarity between the uniform rule and the TS-methods can
be obtained by defining these methods in an alternative way, that reminds of the defi-
nition of the continuous uniform rule, with one proviso: the impossibility of finding a
single “uniform” value λ, for any problem, and instead, moving this common number
between two subsequent integers:
Let σ ∈  be a priority standard. Let e = (N , T, R) ∈ A be a problem. Let
λ(e) ∈ Z+ be the amount such that
∑
i∈N
min{p(Ri ), λ(e) − 1} < T ≤
∑
i∈N
min{p(Ri ), λ(e)} if π(e) ≥ T
∑
i∈N
max{p(Ri ), λ(e)} ≤ T <
∑
i∈N
max{p(Ri ), λ(e) + 1} if π(e) < T,
where π(e) = ∑i∈N p(Ri ). Now, let us define N (e) = {i ∈ N : p(Ri ) ≥ λ(e)} and
T ′(e) = ∑i∈N min{p(Ri ), λ(e)} − T if π(e) ≥ T , and N (e) = {i ∈ N : p(Ri ) ≤
λ(e)} and T ′(e) = T − ∑i∈N max{p(Ri ), λ(e)} if π(e) < T . Let f : A −→ 2N be a
function such that, for each e ∈ A, f (e) ⊂ N (e) and | f (e)| = T ′(e). Each function
f selects the agents in N (e) that receives one of the units in T ′(e).
For each M ∈ N , let 1M be an m-vector in {0, 1}M such that
(1M )i =
{
1 if i ∈ M
0 otherwise
5 Under the assumption that the task is completely divisible, one of the most widely studied rules is the
so-called uniform rule. The idea underlying this solution is equality distribution, subject to efficiency, of
the task.
Uniform rule, u: For each e ∈ A, selects the unique vector u(e) ∈ RN such that: If ∑i∈N p(Ri ) ≥ T , then
u(e) = min{p(Ri ), λ} for some λ ∈ R such that
∑
i∈N min{p(Ri ), λ} = T . And, if
∑
i∈N p(Ri ) ≤ T ,
then u(e) = max{p(Ri ), λ} for some λ ∈ R such that
∑
i∈N max{p(Ri ), λ} = T .
6 In  we consider all priority standards over N × Z. Notice that, for a given e, not all of them rank the
pairs (i, ai ) involved in that particular problem in different ways. e denotes precisely the subset of those
different standards.
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We can define the temporary satisfaction method associated to priority standard
σ ∈  as follows7
T Sσi (e) =
{




i where [N (e)  f (e), λ(e)]σ [ f (e), λ(e)] if π(e) ≥ T




i where [ f (e), λ(e)]σ [N (e)  f (e), λ(e)] if π(e) < T
6 Final remarks
In this work we have considered allocation problems with indivisible goods when pref-
erences are single-peaked, that is, problems in which the task, the allocations and the
preferences are only defined over the set of integer numbers. Our goal is to obtain rules
that represent a good trade-off between efficiency, stability (non-manipulability and
consistency), and equity (balancedness). To do that, we have defined the Temporary
Satisfaction methods. These methods are the only efficient, strategy-proof, consistent
and balanced rules.
In Barberà et al. (1997), a family of allocation rules for the division problem with
single-peaked preferences in the continuous case are introduced. The so called sequen-
tial allotment rules (SAR in short) are the only ones satisfying efficiency, strategy-
proofness, and replacement monotonicity, a property that states that if a change in one
agent’s preferences results in that individual receiving a larger (resp. smaller) share of
the task as before, then all other individuals’ allotments are no larger (resp. no smaller)
than before.8 The construction of SARs can be adapted to the indivisibilities case, with
one proviso: unlike the continuous case, here the guaranteed levels depend on the set
of agents and the task. Then, for a fixed number of agents, the family of SARs in
the case of indivisibilities also satisfy efficiency, strategy-proofness and replacement
monotonicity. It is, nonetheless, an open question whether those are the only rules in
that case fulfilling these requirements. Also, and for any fixed number of agents, any
T Sσ rule can be obtained by a SAR rule, meaning that in the fixed agent case, T S
rules are a subset of the family of sequential allotment rules.
It is easy to adapt the definition of SAR in the indivisibilities case to get rules that
also fulfill balancedness. Nonetheless, for the fixed agents case, not all SAR balanced
rules belong to the family of T S methods. This means that, as it happens in our case,
consistency seems to be crucial. Nonetheless, there is still an open question how to
obtain consistent SARs rules, both in the discrete and continuous framework.
Our procedure and the one proposed in Barberà et al. (1997) are both sequential,
but they are significantly different. While our procedure starts, for any problem, by
assigning each agent her peak, and then moving away on a unit-by-unit basis, their pro-
cedure starts in a feasible (non efficient) allocation, and then adjusting some agents to
their peaks, and distributing the remaining amounts following an unspecified function.
It is far from clear which conditions should be imposed on such adjustment function
to comply with consistency.
7 For each pair of agents sets M, M ′ ⊆ N such that M ∩ M ′ = φ, and each integer a ∈ Z+, we write
[M, a]σ [M ′, a] when (i, a)σ ( j, a) for all i ∈ M and all j ∈ M ′.
8 Replacement monotonicity is also satisfied by the T S methods.
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We have also noticed that, our family of solutions can be characterized by combi-
nations of properties similar to those supporting the characterizations of the uniform
rule. Moreover, the allocation selected by the uniform rule can be interpreted as the
expected allocation of the Temporary Satisfaction methods, if all plausible priority
standards are equally likely.
In comparing Theorem 4.1 with the characterization results in Ching (1994) and
Sprumont (1991) for the continuous case, we observe two differences. First, anonym-
ity cannot be imposed in the presence of indivisibilities. Here, the equity requirement
is captured by balancedness, a less demanding property that does not guarantee
equal treatment, even when this is feasible. And, secondly, unlike Ching (1994) and
Sprumont (1991), consistency plays an important and inescapable role. Interestingly,
we have an additional property to that in Ching (1994), namely, consistency. By means
of that additional property we characterize a full family of solutions in the indivisibil-
ities case, whereas Ching (1994) characterizes a single rule (the uniform rule) in the
perfectly divisible case.
A problem closely related with the one studied here is the case of allocation prob-
lems with indivisibilities when preferences are single-plateaud. If we assume that
preferences are single-peaked on the continuum, and then think of the indivisibili-
ties case as the restriction of those preferences to that case, then preferences on the
indivisible case could be single-plateaud instead of single-peaked. Nonetheless, when
agents are aware of the indivisibilities, single-peakedness is as likely to appear as in
the continuous case. The case in which preferences are single-plateaud in this context
is left for future research.
Appendix A. On the tightness of characterization result
We now present a collection of examples to illustrate the independence of properties
used in Theorem 4.1.
Example 6.1 Let : N −→ Z++ be an order defined over the set of potential agents
such that agent labeled i has priority over agent labeled i + 1, i.e., i  i + 1. The rule
G works as follows. Let e ∈ A. Give to each agent the integer part of the equal split
allocation,9 that is  Tn  for each i ∈ N . If no unit remains we have finished. If some
units, T ′ = T − n ·  Tn , remain, then allot one unit to the T ′ agents with the highest
priority according to .
Example 6.2 Consider a serial dictator rule with a fixed order, , on the set of agents,
SD.
Example 6.3 Alternatively to the Temporary Satisfaction methods, in which we start
by fully satisfying all the agents, we may decide to allocate the task unit by unit,
starting by giving nothing to each agent. Let σ ∈ . Then
Up method associated to σ , Uσ : Let e ∈ A. For each agent in e, consider her
preferred labor supply in e, that is, her peak p(Ri ), and take all pairs {(i, ai )}i∈N with
9 We denote by a the smallest integer number that is no greater than a.
123
462 SERIEs (2011) 2:453–467
Table 1 Independence of properties
Property G SD Uσ F(σ1,σ2)
Efficiency N Y Y Y
Balancedness Y N Y Y
Strategy-proofness Y Y N Y
Consistency Y Y Y N
ai ≤ p(Ri ). Identify the pair with the highest priority, according to σ, and assign
the first unit of the task to the agent in that pair from {(i, ai )}i∈N . Remove the pair.
Identify the agent in the pair with the next highest priority, and assign this agent the
second unit of the task. Proceed in the same way until the task is exhausted.
Example 6.4 This rule, F (σ1,σ2), can be defined as follows. Let σ1, σ2 ∈  be two
different priority standards such that (i, x)σ1(i + 1, x) and (i + 1, x)σ2(i, x). Then,
we define the solution F (σ1,σ2) as
F (σ1,σ2)(e) =
{
T Sσ1(e) if |N | = 2
T Sσ2(e) otherwise
Table 1 shows the independence of properties in Theorem 4.1.
Appendix B. Proofs of the results
We present in this appendix the proof of Theorem 4.1 and Proposition 5.1, preceded
by some technical results.
Let us consider an allocation for a problem with the following feature. For each
two-agent subset, the rule chooses the restriction of that allocation for the associated
reduced problem to this agent subset. Converse consistency requires the allocation to
be the one selected by the rule for the original problem. This property was formulated
by Chun (1999) in the context of claims problems.
Let c.con(e; F) ≡ {x ∈ ZN+ :
∑
i∈N xi = T and for all S ⊂ N such that |S| =
2, xS = F(S,∑i∈S xi , RS)}
Converse consistency. For each e ∈ A, c.con(e; F) 
= φ, and if x ∈ c.con(e; F),
then x = F(e).
Peak-only says that an agent’s allocation depends only on his preferred consump-
tion.
Peak-only. For each e = (N , T, (Ri , R−i )) ∈ A and each e′ = (N , T, (R′i , R−i )) ∈
A such that p(R′i ) = p(Ri ), then Fi (e) = Fi (e′).
One-sided resource monotonicity, considers the case in which there is a change
in the task that does not alter the type of rationing associated to the initial problem,
i.e, if initially we have to ration labor, it is still labor to be rationed after the task has
increased or, otherwise, if in the initial problem we have to ration leisure, then again,
we have excess of labor to allocate even after the decreasing of the task. In either case,
the property states that no agent should suffer.
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One-sided resource monotonicity: For each e, e′ ∈ A such that e = (N , T, R)
and e′ = (N , T ′, R). If (a) ∑ j∈N p(R j ) ≥ T ′ > T , or (b)
∑
j∈N p(R j ) ≤ T ′ < T .
Then for each i ∈ N , Fi (e′)Ri Fi (e).
Lemma 6.1 (Elevator Lemma, (Thomson (1998a))) If a rule F is consistent and coin-
cides with a conversely consistent rule F ′ in the two agent case, then it coincides with
F ′ in general.
The following Lemma is due to Ching (1994), Even though the author proves the
result for the continuous case, it is still valid in presence of indivisibilities.
Lemma 6.2 Efficiency and strategy-proofness together imply peak-only.
Lemma 6.3 Efficiency, one-sided resource monotonicity, and consistency together
imply converse consistency.
Proof Let e ∈ A. By consistency the set c.con(e; F) 
= φ. Let x, y ∈ c.con(e; F)
with x 
= y. We distinguish two cases.
Case 1. If
∑
i∈N p(Ri ) ≥ T . Since, x 
= y, there exists k ∈ N such that xk > yk .
Consider each two-agent set S = {k, j} with j ∈ N and j 
= k. Since
x, y ∈ c.con(e; F), xS = F(S, x j +xk, RS) and yS = F(S, y j +yk, RS). By
efficiency and one-sided resource monotonicity, x j ≥ y j . This fact, together
with xk > yk , and
∑
i∈N xi = T =
∑
i∈N yi yields a contradiction.
Case 2. If
∑
i∈N p(Ri ) ≤ T . There exists k ∈ N such that xk < yk . Consider
each two-agent set S = {k, j} with j ∈ N and j 
= k. Since x, y ∈
c.con(T, R; F), xS = F(S, x j + xk, RS) and yS = F(S, y j + yk, RS). By
efficiency and one-sided resource monotonicity, x j ≤ y j . This fact, together
with xk < yk , and
∑
i∈N xi = T =
∑
i∈N yi yields a contradiction.
unionsq
Lemma 6.4 Let F be a rule satisfying efficiency, balancedness, and strategy-proofnes.
Let e, e′ ∈ A be two problems involving two agents, {i, j}, e = ({i, j}, T, (R, R)); e′ =
({i, j}, T, (R′, R′)) such that either both 2p(R), 2p(R′) are strictly larger or both
strictly smaller than T . Then, F(e) = F(e′).
Proof First, consider the case where 2p(R) > T, 2p(R′) > T . Let R′′ be such
that p(R′′) = T+12 , and let e′′ = ({i, j}, T, (R′′, R′′)). We shall prove that F(e) =
F(e′′) = F(e′).
If T is even, balancedness implies the result. Let T = 2λ + 1, for some λ ∈ Z,
and suppose, w.l.o.g., that F(e′′) = (λ, λ + 1), whereas F(e) = (λ + 1, λ). This
is the only possibility of discrepancy because of efficiency and balancedness. Since
p(R) ≥ p(R′′) = λ+ 1, agent j is happier in problem e′′ than he is in problem e, and
it is the other way around for agent i . Additionally, strategy-proofness implies that
Fi ({i, j}, T, (R, R′′)) ≤ λ; Fj ({i, j}, T, (R, R′′)) ≤ λ
The first inequality follows from agent i’s inability to get a better result when mis-
representing his preferences in problem e′′, while the second inequality follows from
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agent j’s inability to benefit from misrepresenting his preferences in problem e. But,
if this is the case,
Fi ({i, j}, T, (R, R′′)) + Fj ({i, j}, T, (R, R′′)) ≤ 2λ < T
which is a contradiction with F being a rule.
The case where 2p(R) < T, 2p(R′) < T is analogous. unionsq
Proof of Theorem 4.1 It is easy to check that each T Sσ satisfies the four properties.
Conversely, let F be a rule satisfying all the properties. We divide the rest of the proof
into two steps.
Step 1. Definition of the priority standard. Let us define the order σ ∈  as follows
a > b ⇒ (i, a)σ ( j, b)
a = b ⇒ [(i, a)σ ( j, b) ⇔ Fi ({i, j}, 2a − 1, (Ri , R j )) = a − 1],
where Ri and R j are two single-peaked preference relations such that
p(Ri ) = a = b = p(R j ) (by Lemma 6.2 it is enough to consider the peaks).
It is straightforward to see that such a σ is complete and antisymmetric. Let
us show that σ is transitive. Suppose that there exist {i, j, k} ⊆ N such that
(i, x)σ ( j, y), ( j, y)σ (k, z), but (k, z)σ (i, x). By construction and peak-only
(implied by efficiency and strategy-proofness according to Lemma 6.2), this
can only happen when x = y = z. By the definition of σ , in such a case,
Fi ({i, j}, 2x − 1, (Ri , R j )) = x − 1, Fj ({ j, k}, 2x − 1, (R j , Rk)) = x − 1,
and Fk({k, i}, 2x −1, (Rk, Ri )) = x −1, where p(Ri ) = p(R j ) = p(Rk) =
x = y = z. Consider the problem ({i, j, k}, 3x − 2, (Ri , R j , Rk)). There
are only three possible allocations: (x − 1, x − 1, x), (x − 1, x, x − 1), and
(x, x−1, x−1). Suppose that F({i, j, k}, 3x−2, (Ri , R j , Rk)) = (x−1, x−
1, x), by consistency, Fk({i, k}, 2x −1, (Ri , Rk)) = x , achieving in this way
a contradiction with Fk({i, k}, 2x−1, (Ri , R j )) = x−1. An analogous argu-
ment is applied if F({i, j, k}, 3x −2, (Ri , R j , Rk)) = (x −1, x, x −1), or if
F({i, j, k}, 3x−2, (Ri , R j , Rk)) = (x, x−1, x−1). Therefore (i, x)σ (k, z),
and then σ is transitive.
Step 2. Let us now prove that F = T Sσ . It is straightforward that T Sσ is effi-
cient, one-sided resource monotonic, and consistent, then, by Lemma 6.3,
T Sσ is conversely consistent. Therefore, in application of Lemma 6.1, it is
enough to show that F = T Sσ in the two-agent case. Then, let us consider
the problem e = (S, T, R) ∈ A where S = {i, j}. Without loss of gen-
erality we can assume that p(Ri ) ≤ p(R j ). We analyze the case in which
p(Ri )+ p(R j ) ≥ T . The other case is completely analogous. We distinguish
the following cases:







Case 2. If Ri = R j and T is odd. If T = 2p(Ri ) − 1, by the definition
of the priority standard, F(e) = T Sσ (e). If T < 2p(Ri ) − 1,
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by Lemma 6.4, F(e) = F(S, T, (R′i , R′j )), where R′i = R′j and
p(R′i ) = p(R′j ) = T+12 . And then, F(e) = F(S, T, (R′i , R′j )) =
T Sσ (S, T, (R′i , R′j )) = T σ (e).
Case 3. If Fi (e) ≤ Fj (e) ≤ p(Ri ) ≤ p(R j ). By efficiency and strategy-
proofness, Fi (e) = Fi (S, T, (R j , R j )) = T Sσi (S, T, (R j , R j )) =
T Sσi (e). And then F(e) = T Sσ (e).
Case 4. If Fj (e) ≤ Fi (e) ≤ p(Ri ) ≤ p(R j ). By efficiency and strategy-
proofness, Fj (e) = Fj (S, T, (Ri , Ri )) = T Sσj (S, T, (Ri , Ri )) =
T Sσj (e). And then F(e) = T Sσ (e).
Case 5. If Fi (e) ≤ p(Ri ) < Fj (e) ≤ p(R j ). By efficiency and strat-
egy-proof, Fi (e) = Fi (S, T, (R j , R j )) = T Sσi (S, T, (R j , R j )) =
T Sσi (e). And then F(e) = T Sσ (e).
Then, F coincides with T Sσ in the two-agent case and, therefore, they do so
in general.
unionsq
Proof of Proposition 5.1 Let e ∈ A be a problem. Let p = (p1, . . . , pn) be the vector
of peaks in e, where, w.l.o.g, we assume that p1 ≤ . . . ≤ pn . Let π =
∑
i∈N pi
denote the sum of the peaks. We use the following notation: for each M ∈ N and each
T ∈ Z, let ρ(M, T ) ∈ {0, 1}N be a vector whose entries are either 0 or 1, and such
that ρ(M, T )i = 0 if i /∈ M and
∑
i∈N ρ(M, T )i = T . We distinguish three cases.
Case 1. If T ≤ π . Let us define αk =
∑
i∈N min{pi , pk}, Nk = {i ∈ N : pi ≤ pk},
and nk = |Nk |.
• If T ∈ [0, α1[, it is not difficult to check that




















The average of these vectors is equal to u(e).
• If T ∈ [α1, α2[,





























































The average of these vectors is equal to u(e).
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• In general, if T ∈ [αk, αk+1[,





























































The average of these vectors is equal to u(e).
Case 2. If T = π , the result is obvious.
Case 3. If T ≥ π . Let us define βk = π +
∑
i∈N max{0, pk − pi }, Mk = {i ∈ N :
pi ≤ pk}, and mk = |Mk |.
• If T ∈]βk, βk+1],


























































The average of these vectors is equal to u(e).
• Finally, if T > n · pn




















The average of these vectors is equal to u(e).
We have covered the possible values of T . unionsq
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